In August 2025, civil society celebrated the Court of Appeal decision in Heidy Quah Gaik Li v Kerajaan Malaysia, which struck out the words “offensive” and “annoy” in section 233(1)(a) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA) on the ground that they were inconsistent with Article 10. The Court of Appeal held that the impugned words did not fall within the permissible restrictions under Article 10, particularly in relation to public order or morality.
The Federal Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision, holding that striking out the impugned words would leave a segment of users vulnerable to improper conduct carried out through network facilities, including doxxing, online harassment, malicious online pranks or hoaxes, and racist or religiously derogatory communications intended to cause anger, dissatisfaction or annoyance.
Instead of striking out the provision, the Federal Court held that courts should adopt the doctrine of “reading down” to preserve Parliament’s intent and the mischief addressed by the CMA.
Applying the “reading down” principle to the phrase ‘offensive with intent to annoy’, there is basis for prosecution if the ‘offensive’ communication is undertaken with an express intent to annoy another user or a body of users. The requisite mens rea element of the intent to annoy must be met.
In respect of the definition of offensive and grossly offensive, the Federal Court held that the terms have to be considered in the context of network communications.
The term ‘offensive’ therein refers to the character of a message or material communicated through networks and encompasses several categories of harmful communications, including material that is indecent or obscene, communications that threaten harm, encourage crime or incite public disorder, as well as false or malicious communications deliberately disseminated to cause distress, anxiety or annoyance. For the purposes of enforcement, the content must objectively fall within these categories or their equivalent forms of harmful communication and must be coupled with the requisite intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass.
The term “annoy” targets vexatious or targeted online conduct such as trolling, doxxing and nuisance behaviour that causes emotional or psychological distress. The test is whether the dominant purpose of the communication is to cause annoyance or harm, and not whether annoyance is merely an incidental consequence of legitimate expression.
Applying this narrowed construction, the Federal Court held that Heidy Quah should not have been charged as it fell within the protection of freedom of speech.
An earlier version of this case summary was published by Foong Cheng Leong on LinkedIn.
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