BurgieLaw

Bread & Kaya: 2019 Malaysian Cyber Law Cases

– Launch of Lexscout.com for public to search unreported Court judgments & lawsuits
– Emergence of new businesses in digital economy sees new rules, regulations, Court cases
– 2014 fatwa directing MCMC to block certain sites, deemed not contravening law
– Movement Control Order to generate more cyber & IT related disputes in the Court

There had been a steady increase of cyber-defamation cases filed in our Courts in 2019. The number of cyber-related tort cases filed in the Kuala Lumpur High Court in 2019 increased to 70 over from over 60 cases in 2018.

The emergence of new types of business in our digital economy saw the grow of new types of rules and regulations, and Court cases.

We saw the first digital currency Court case in our Court which led to the Court recognising that digital currency is a form of an intangible asset.

Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending brought a new way of funding to businesses but like many other credit businesses, they had to resort to Court proceedings to recover their debts.

The Court also had to deal with an e-hailing company’s liability in a road accident involving its e-hailing vehicle. The Department of Industrial Relation had to deal with whether a Grab car driver is an employee and may file a claim with the Department of Industrial Relation contrary to Grab’s position that e-hailing drivers are independent contractors.

Burgielaw and I had also jointly developed Lexscout, a portal for the public to search unreported Court judgments and lawsuits. The judgement search allows users to search more than 14,000 legal case judgments of the Malaysia Subordinate Courts up to the Federal Court. Many of these judgements are not reported by local law journals. The lawsuit search function is first of its kind in Malaysia. Users can now search if a person or company has been involved in a lawsuit in Malaysia.

WhatsApp

Malaysia’s most popular instant messaging application has got some people in trouble with the law.

In Pegawai Pengurus Pilihanraya Dewan Undangan Negeri Bagi Pilihan Raya Dun N.27 Amino Agos Bin Suyub v Dr. Streram a/l Sinnasamy & 2 Lagi [2019] 1 LNS 589, the appellant, an election official of the State Legislative Assembly for By-Election of District of Rembau, Negeri Sembilan, was found guilty of contempt of Court in the High Court for coaching a witness through WhatsApp. The Court of Appeal however allowed the appeal on the ground that such act may not fall under contempt in the face of court per se if the court has not warned the particular person that he should not communicate with the witness. Further, the Court of Appeal found that there was a breach of natural justice when the witness was not called to testify in the contempt proceedings. The Court of Appeal ordered the contempt proceedings to be sent to the High Court for retrial.

An employee was terminated by her employer after she left the WhatsApp Group of the Company (Thilagavathy a/p Arunasalam v Maxis Mobile Sdn Bhd [2019] 2 LNS 1050). For purpose of communicating with employees it was common practice by the employer at Maxis Retail Centres to create WhatsApp Groups among its employees for ease of communication, fast updates and responses for business operations. Two WhatsApp Groups were created for employees at Maxis Centre E-Curve, namely “Maxis e @ Curve” and “MSSC e @ Curve Home & EOMC”. The Head of Maxis Centre E-Curve (COW-2) stated that he had informed all employees (including the Claimant) stationed at Maxis Centre E-Curve that they had to inform him in advance if they wish to exit from the WhatsApp Group. It required his approval before they could exit the group.

The Claimant’s employment was terminated by her employer after she had exited from her employer’s WhatsApp groups twice without permission. She had also failed to submit her sales report, as required by her employer.

The Industrial Court held that Claimant was in breach of her terms of employment with the Company when she failed to follow the reasonable oral and written instructions of COW-2 i.e. to obtain approval prior to exiting the WhatsApp Group.

In the meantime, a man was jailed for sharing a video of his wife’s cousin taking a bath on his family WhatsApp group. In Pendakwa Raya v Nor Hanizam Bin Mohd Noor [2019] 1 LNS 944, the accused was charged under s. 509 of the Penal Code for outraging the modesty of wife’s cousin. The accused pleaded guilty and the Magistrate Court Judge sentenced him to two (2) months imprisonment. The Prosecution was not satisfied with the sentence and appealed to the High Court.

On appeal, the High Court has this to say, in Bahasa Malaysia, about invasion of privacy –

Keseriusan isu ini menjadi lebih memuncak di dalam zaman siber yang serba canggih di mana sesuatu berita atau imej sudah boleh dihebahkan kepada dunia dengan sekelip mata. Muat naik berita, imej dan video sudah menjadi sesuatu perkara yang sangat mudah dan selera masyarakat terhadap sesuatu berita, imej atau video sudah mencapai kepada suatu peringkat di mana nilai privasi, maruah dan keaiban sesorang dikompromi dan diketepikan dengan sewenang-wenangnya. Bahan lucah, berita palsu, fitnah, tohmahan dan sebagainya sudah menjadi suatu pengisian media yang dinantikan oleh sebahagian masyarakat dan ia mendatangkan masalah moral yang sangat serius di kalangan masyarakat sehingga menular di kalangan remaja.

In short, what the Court said was, “In this digital age, information and content can spread in the blink of an eye. The ease of uploading images and videos, too easily done, with society’s appetite for such reaching an unhealthy level where privacy and dignity are compromised and disregarded too easily. Fake news, slander and pornography have become media staples eagerly consumed by a segment of society resulting in serious moral problems in society and our youth.

The High Court Judge also held that the words “intrudes upon the privacy” under s. 509 of the Penal Code includes recording a person without permission and distributing the video.

The High Court enhanced the imprisonment period to six months from the date of conviction.

Peer-to-peer (P2P) Lending

Peer-to-peer lending, also abbreviated as P2P lending, is the practice of lending money to individuals or businesses through online services that match lenders with borrowers.

In Malaysia, the Securities Commission governs the operation of P2P financing. The Securities Commission only allows P2P operator to facilitate businesses or companies to raise funds from both retail and sophisticated investors through an online platform.

P2P operators are not permitted to facilitate individuals seeking personal financing. This is because the primary objective of introducing market-based financing is to help build small businesses which in turn help to spur and promote growth of the economy. Through the Securities Commission registered P2P platform, an investor may invest in an investment note or an Islamic investment note issued by businesses or companies for a specified tenure with the expectation of a predetermined financial return.

Since 2017, there have been 2,505 successful peer-to-peer (P2P) financing campaigns across 643 issuers, with a total of US$49.3 million (RM212.65 million) raised. Issuers raising funds on P2P financing platforms have maintained a campaign success rate of 99%. In 2018, a total of RM180.05 million was raised reflecting 452% growth from 2017. Among the successful fundraising campaigns, 91% raised RM200,000 and below. 22% of the successful issuers raised more than once. (Data from Securities Commission Annual Report 2018.)

Notwithstanding the above success, some issuers could not repay what they have raised. The operator of “Funding Societies”, Modalku Ventures Sdn Bhd, had to commence legal proceedings against a few companies to recover the facilities. Modalku is registered as a recognized market operator under s. 34 of the Capital Market and Services Act 2017 to operate a P2P platform.

In Modalku Ventures Sdn Bhd v Reliance Shipping & Travel Agencies (Sarawak) Sdn Bhd & Anor (Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court Suit No. WA-B52NCC-392-06/2019) raised a novel defence by claiming that P2P financing is illegal under the Moneylenders Act 1951.

The Plaintiff granted the 1st Defendant facilities of RM650,000 to be utilised as working capital of the 1st Defendant. The 2nd Defendant is a director and guarantor of the 1st Defendant. An investment note certified was issued by the 1st Defendant to the investors of the 1st Defendant.

The 1st Defendant defaulted in the loan and the Plaintiff sued for the outstanding amount. The Plaintiff sought for an order for summary judgment of the outstanding amount.

The Defendants argued that the Facility Agreement is illegal pursuant to the Moneylenders Act 1951 and Moneylenders (Amendment) Act 2003 because the Plaintiff is not licensed to carry out money lending activities.

In view that the Plaintiff is a registered market operator, the Sessions Court held that Moneylenders Act 1951 does not apply to the Plaintiff. S. 2A(1) read together with Item 10 of the First Schedule of the Moneylenders Act 1951 provides that the Moneylenders Act 1951 does not apply to any person licensed, registered or regulated under the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007.

Accordingly, the Sessions Court granted the summary judgment. Appeal to the High Court was dismissed in Civil Appeal No. WA-12ANCC-69-09/2019.

Similarly, in Modalku Ventures Sdn Bhd v Reliance Shipping & Travel Agencies (Sabah) Sdn Bhd & Anor (Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court Suit No. WA-B52NCC-393-06/2019), the Defendants, in resisting an application for summary judgment, argued that the Facility Agreement and security documents are illegal pursuant to the Moneylenders Act 1951 and Moneylenders (Amendment) Act 2003 because the Plaintiff is not licensed to carry out money lending activities and a contravention of s. 15A of the Moneylenders Act 1951 which provides that “no moneylending agreement in respect of money lent after the coming into force of this Act by an unlicensed moneylender shall be enforceable”.

The Plaintiff argued that s. 2A of the Moneylenders Act 1951 read together with Item 12 of the First Schedule of the Moneylenders Act 1951 provides that the Moneylenders Act 1951 does not apply to any person licensed, registered or regulated under the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007.

The Sessions Court agreed with the Plaintiff that the Moneylenders Act 1951 does not apply and therefore the Facilities Agreement and security documents are valid and enforceable.

E-hailing company’s liability in accidents

In Tea Chew Chin v Grabcar Sdn Bhd & Ors (Sessions Court Suit No. JA-A53KJ-610-10/2018), the Plaintiff was injured when the Grabcar driven by the 2nd Defendant and owned by the 3rd Defendant was involved in an accident. The Plaintiff claims that Grabcar was also responsible for his injuries as they have failed to provide a safe transportation platform. Grabcar on the other hand argued that they are not vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver or owner of any car that used the Grab application to participate in the Grab ride hailing service. Grab applied to strike out the case but the suit was later withdrawn.

A few months later, the insurer of the car owned by the 3rd Defendant sued the Plaintiff and all the other Defendants in the earlier suit (MPI Generali Insurans Berhad v Tea Chew Chin & 3 Ors (Johor Bahru High Court Suit No. JA-24NCvC-320-05/2019) and sought an order to declare that the insurance policy is invalid as the car was not used for private use. Grab again argued that it should not have been joined as a party to this action as they were merely providing the mobile application on the “Grab” platform for various car owners and drivers to operate ride hailing services, they had no connection whatsoever with the car and the insurance policy. The High Court dismissed the insurer’s action. However, no grounds of judgment is available.

Digital Currencies

In my article Bread & Kaya: Malaysia’s first digital currency court case, I wrote about Malaysia’s first digital currency court case. In Luno Pte Ltd & Anor v Robert Ong Thien Cheng (Sessions Court Civil Suit No. BA-B52NCVC-389-12/2017), the 1st Plaintiff mistakenly transferred 11.3 Bitcoins onto the Defendant’s e-Wallet which the Defendant refused to return. The Plaintiffs sued the Defendant for the return of the 11.3 Bitcoins under s. 73 Contracts Act 1950. The Defendant argued that, among others, Bitcoins are not a “thing” capable of being returned as envisaged under s. 73 Contracts Act 1950, cryptocurrency is illegal in Malaysia and therefore, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover the same. The Sessions Court allowed the Plaintiffs’ claim and the Defendant appealed to the High Court.

The High Court (Shah Alam High Court Civil Appeal No. 12BNCVC-91-10/2018) dismissed the appeal and held that, among others, cryptocurrency trading is not illegal in Malaysia, digital currency is a form of an intangible asset and digital currency is a “thing” that has to be returned if it is mistakenly delivered. The matter is now pending at the Court of Appeal

Discovery of the Identity of Facebook User

In the past, Court actions were filed overseas against online service providers such as Google to obtain information of certain online users. Such action can be done either through a pre-action discovery application or a Court subpoena. It can cost the aggrieved party substantial amount of legal fees as foreign counsels have to be engaged to conduct the matter in Court. Further, it is not guaranteed that the service provider will provide the information.

However, through Lexscout.com, I found a case which shows that pre-action discovery application against Facebook can be made in Malaysia instead of filing such application outside Malaysia. In Universiti Utara Malaysia v Facebook Inc (Alor Setar High Court Originating Summons No. KA-24-1-01/2019), Facebook agreed to disclose basic subscriber information of certain Facebook users who allegedly have published defamatory statements against the Plaintiff (also known as a pre-action discovery order).

Filing a pre-action discovery application is one of the most efficient ways. The use of private investigators may also help and it is much more affordable and may be faster. However, it comes with a risk. The investigation by the private investigator may not be conclusive enough for the Court. This happened in the case of P.T. Tarakusuma Indah & Anor v The Qbee Motor Group Sdn Bhd [2019] 1 LNS 1619 where the Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendant was the person behind a certain Facebook page that had defamed them. The Plaintiff relied on the investigation report by a private investigator (PW2). The investigation report concluded that the administrator of the Facebook page “is someone employed or related‟ to the Defendant company or any other related companies such as QBEE Superbike Centre Sdn Bhd, Quian Long Auto Parts Sdn Bhd”.

The High Court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ action and held that they have failed to prove that the Defendant had published or distributed the impugned statements or had caused the impugned statements to be made or published or distributed in the Facebook page. The finding in the investigation report was vague and inconclusive and uncertain as to who the administrator for the Facebook page was. The Plaintiffs’ evidence on this point was purely based on assumption that it was the Defendant who made those impugned statements.

Legality of contracts made online

The High Court recognised that contract can be proven through WhatsApp conversation. In Lim Choon Hau v. Simpson Wong [2019] 1 LNS 217, HC, the High Court held that a WhatsApp conversion can be direct evidence of the Defendants receiving money as friendly loan from the 1st Plaintiff.

Thousands of contracts are made online every day. Many of us accept that such contracts are binding on the parties without having to meet each other physically or putting in a manuscript signature. Unfortunately, many do not read the contracts whenever they purchase the goods or services.

One of these online contracts is called browsewrap agreement. In a browsewrap agreement, the contract is located in another page. To view the contract, the user would need to click on the link to access the page. The defining feature of browsewrap agreements is that the user can continue to use the website or its services without visiting the page hosting the browsewrap agreement.

In Ragindran a/l Sivasamy v Airasia X Berhad (Penang Magistrate Court Civil Suit No. PD-A72-1-1/2019), the Magistrate Court dealt with the legality of an online contracts commonly known as a browsewrap agreement.

The Plaintiff had purchased his air ticket from the Defendant’s website to travel to Melbourne, Australia. The Plaintiff lost his luggage during his flight to Kuala Lumpur International Airport 2 (KLIA 2) and thereafter to Melbourne. The Defendant then offered compensation to the Plaintiff based on the tariff that had been set at USD20.00 per kilogramme. The Plaintiff however rejected the tariff and claimed for the sum of RM11,700 for the loss of, among others, his watch, glasses, winter wear, clothing and additional clothing that he had to purchase in Melbourne due to the loss of clothing.

The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff is bound by its terms and conditions incorporated into the Terms and Conditions of the Defendant’s international flight and are available on the Defendant’s website.

However, the Plaintiff claims that he is not bound to the Defendant’s terms and conditions as-

(a) the terms and conditions were not brought to his attention at the time of purchase of the tickets. Instead each purchaser is required to click on the words “Terms and Conditions” to see the complete terms and conditions of the flight;
(b) the terms and conditions were only applicable to his domestic flight to Kuala Lumpur but not his international flight to Melbourne;
(c) the Defendant had caused the loss of his luggage; and
(d) the total compensation offered by the Defendant is lower than what he had lost.

During the trial, one of the Defendant’s witnesses demonstrated in Court how to purchase tickets through the Defendant’s website. The said witness testified that there is a notice above the payment button stating “By clicking “Purchase”, you confirm that you understand and accept our Terms and Conditions of Carriage, which address cancellation, refund and rebooking, no show, baggage allowance and travel documents, and other policies. ”

The “Purchase” button is placed next to the notice. For the display of the detailed flight terms and conditions, a user simply has to click on the words “Terms and Conditions of Carriage ” in red in the notice and upon doing so, the website will direct the user to another page displaying the terms and conditions of flight.

The learned Magistrate held that it would be reasonable for the Defendant to expect that any person purchasing an airline ticket from the Defendant’s website would know of the terms and conditions of the flight.

The Magistrate found that the Defendant had put sufficient notice on its website for its users by putting a notice next to the Purchase button with a red hyperlink. It is the Plaintiff’s obligation to read the terms and conditions. A contract is formed as soon as the payment is made, and any terms and conditions of the flight would bind the parties as soon as the contract is made.

This matter is pending before the Penang High Court (Civil Appeal Suit No. PA-11B-37-09/2019).

Trade marks

After 43 years, the Trade Marks Act 1976 was repealed and replaced with the Trademarks Act 2019. The new law finally implemented the Madrid Protocol which allows a trade mark owner to file an international trademark application in 122 countries (subject to additional fee for every country) through the Intellectual Property Corp of Malaysia (MyIPO) beginning from 27 December 2019.

Prior to the repeal of the old law, the Court made a few important decisions in respect of online trade mark infringement.

In 30 Maple Sdn Bhd v. Siti Safiyyah Mohd Firdaus Chew [2019] 1 LNS 404, the Defendant was found to have infringed the Plaintiff’s registered trade marks for selling counterfeit dUCk products on her social media accounts such as Instagram, Instagram Stories, Facebook, etc. In addition, the Intellectual Property High Court found that the social media postings amount to advertising circulars or other advertisement representing as having the right either as the registered proprietor or user to use the trade mark. Therefore, the Defendant was in breach of s. 38(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1976 (repealed and replaced by the Trademarks Act 2019) which prohibits the use of a registered trade mark on goods or in physical relation thereto or in an advertising circular, or other advertisement.

In Telekom Malaysia Berhad & Anor v CA Multimedia Sdn Bhd & Ors [2019] MLJU 1664, the Intellectual Property High Court found that certain Defendants had infringed and passed off the trade mark TMPOINT for using the domain name tmpoint.com and the mark TMPOINT on their website. The Defendants have attempted to differentiate between website and domain name. Though they may be technically different in function, the Court found that they operate in unison and hence ought to be treated as one for purposes of trade mark infringement.

What amounts to parody?

Prior to the fall of the Barisan Nasional Government in the 2018 General Election, several people were charged in Court for publishing content which were themed as anti-Government. One of them is Fahmi Reza, who is also known as kuasasiswa. He was charged under s. 233(1)(a) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 in the Sessions Court for publishing a false notice purporting to be by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission featuring the logo of the Commission and an image of a clown resembling the then Prime Minister Najib Bin Razak on his Facebook page with an intent to annoy (Mohd Fahmi Reza Mohd Zarin lwn. PP [2019] 1 LNS 120). He was found guilty and sentenced to 1 month jail and fine of RM30,000.

On appeal, the accused argued that the notice is a parody and political satire to criticise the authorities for restricting freedom of expression and the Internet.

Justice Mohd Radzi Harun found that the notice is a fine and creative artistic work created by the accused to criticise the authorities, however it is false in nature and was created with an intention to annoy a person. His Lordship was of the view that there is no need for the Prosecution to prove that the accused annoyed the complainant but whether he intended to annoy him.

His Lordship also found that the notice cannot be considered as a parody because it does not fall within the definition of parody set out in the case of Sepakat Efektif Sdn Bhd v. Menteri Dalam Negeri & Anor and Another Appeal [2015] 2 CLJ 328 which provides-

“The pithy observation by Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Laugh it Off Promotions CC v. South African Breweries International (Finance) Case [2005] 5 LRC 475, is quoted to indicate the proper approach courts should take when assessing parodies and satires:

“If parody does not prickle it does not work.”

Therefore, his Lordship held that the notice is an artistic work but due to its nature of annoying another, it therefore has no right to be displayed by the accused and is not protected by freedom of speech.

His Lordship however replaced the Sessions Court’s sentence with a fine of RM10,000 in lieu of 6 months imprisonment in view of, among others, media reports stating that the Minister of Communication and Multimedia is making amendments to s. 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 to repeal elements which are considered as draconian.

Challenging website access blocking order

The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) is known to block websites without notice. The power to block website is purportedly based on s. 263(2) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998. MCMC or any authorities may request MCMC to “request” internet service providers to disable access by end-users in Malaysia to online location for the purpose of “preventing the commission or attempted commission of an offence under any written law of Malaysia or otherwise in enforcing the laws of Malaysia, including, but not limited to, the protection of the public revenue and preservation of national security”.

Sometime in 2014, Fatwa Committee of the State of Selangor issued a fatwa declaring that SIS Forum deviates from the teaching of Islam and directed that the MCMC block any social websites which is against the teaching of Islam and “Hukum Syarak” (see SIS Forum (Malaysia) & Ors v. Jawatankuasa Fatwa Negeri Selangor & Ors [2018] 6 CLJ 748).

The Plaintiff challenged the fatwa and filed an action in the High Court praying for, among others, a declaration that the fatwa to the extent that it directs the MCMC to block social websites is contrary to s. 3(3) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 which provides that nothing in the Act shall be construed as permitting the censorship of the Internet.

After some years, the High Court recently held that the fatwa only requested the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission to block any website which contravene the teaching of Islam and Hukum Syarak. The fatwa does not create any law that can block any website. As such, the issue of contravention of s. 3(3) does not arise.

Furthermore, the fatwa itself is not an offence but the offences were the acts prohibited by ss. 12 and 13 of the Syariah Criminal Offences (Selangor) Enactment 1995. The fatwa merely states certain acts are within the Hukum Syarak or otherwise. The fatwa therefore cannot be said to create offences infringed the provision of s. 3(3).

Short Term Lodging – AirBnB Effect

Last year, I reported that the High Court in Verve Suites Mont’ Kiara Management Corporation v Innab Salil & 8 Ors (Kuala Lumpur High Originating Summons No: WA-22NCVC-461-09/2017) upheld the ban of short term lodging by the Management Corporation of Verve Suites Mont Kiara through its House Rules.

The matter went up to the Court of Appeal ([2019] MLJU 1496) and the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision. The Court of Appeal held, among others, that the Strata Management Act 2013 (SMA 2013) is to advance interest in communal living within a strata scheme. Therefore, it would defeat the spirit and purpose of the SMA 2013 for the proprietors such as the Defendants to use their residential units in the form of business enterprise such as short term rentals. The majority of the residents have voted against the same. The majorities’ wish has to be taken heed of, hence there could never be any violation of s. 70(5) when House Rules No. 3 was adopted.

Challenging Court’s decision in implementing electronic bidding

Last year, I reported that The Council of Auctioneers Malaysia challenged the decision by the High Court Registrar to implement electronic bidding or e-Lelong in all courts in West Malaysia (Majlis Pelelong Malaysia v. Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya (Kuala Lumpur Judicial Review Application No. WA-25-313-10/2018). The High Court held that the issue of implementation of e-Lelong is justiciable as the decision to implement the e-Lelong system was made and translated with the issuance of Registrar’s Practice Direction No. 1 of 2018. This decision is made based on the Respondent’s public duty.

However, the High Court held that the implementation of the e-Lelong system is in accordance with law, in particular, O. 31A r. 7 of the Rules of Court 2012. Further, based on the literal interpretation of s. 259(1) and (2) of the National Land Code, the appointment of licensed auctioneer in a public auction is based on the discretion of Court and not a mandatory requirement to make such appointment in a public auction. Public auctioneers therefore cannot be said to have a right under the law to be appointed in a public auction.

In addition, the Registrar’s Practice Direction No. 1 of 2018 cannot be said to have infringed Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law. The High Court held that the right of a person under Article 5 can be restricted by law. In any event, the applicant has no right in law in a public auction as the involvement of licensed auctioneers are based on the discretion of Court. The e-Lelong system is to increase the efficiency of public auction and to ensure transparency of the system. The Applicant had also failed to show any basis for the application of Article 8 of the Federal Constitution which provides that all persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law.

Therefore, the Applicant has failed to show that the e-Lelong system in the High Court is tainted with illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety.

Anti-Fake News Act 2018

The Government finally repealed the Anti-Fake News Act 2018 via the Anti-Fake News (Repeal) Act 2020. Before the repeal of this law, Qnet (M) Sdn Bhd managed to obtain an Order for Removal of Publication Containing Fake News pursuant to s. 7 of the Anti-Fake News Act 2018 over certain publications on Facebook. The order was then served on Facebook Malaysia Sdn Bhd and Facebook Singapore Pte Ltd. However, Facebook took the position that the order ought to be served on Facebook, Inc, the company operating Facebook service for users in Malaysia. Qnet applied to commit Facebook Malaysia and its directors for contempt of Court but was not successful (Qnet (M) Sdn Bhd v Facebook Malaysia Sdn Bhd (Sessions Court Originating Summons No. WA-B54-37- 07/2018)). The matter is now pending at the High Court (Civil Appeal No. WA-12ANCvC-290-12/2018).

In closing

In 2020, we can expect more interesting developments in the cyberlaw and IT sphere.

– Earlier this year, it was reported that Artificial Intelligence (AI) was implemented by our Court to aid sentencing for crimes committed. It will only be used for two offences in Sabah and Sarawak courts – s.12(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 for drug possession and Section 376 of the Penal Code for rape.

In the first case where AI was used, Magistrate Jessica Ombou Kakayun sentence Christopher Divineson Moinol to nine months’ jail after he pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of 0.16g of methamphetamine.

– In another case, the counsel of Denis P. Modili objected to the use of the AI to his charge of possession of 0.01g of methamphetamine. Counsel for the accused argued that the use of the AI will be a breach of Articles 5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution. He further argued that the court should confine to only materials presented in the court. The use of the AI is not in accordance with the law. Although the court can choose to ignore (the AI recommendation), it might influence the decision.

The learned Magistrate noted the defence’s objection and said she would proceed with AI use, which makes recommendations based on information derived from the court’s database between 2014 and 2019. The AI system proposed 10 months’ imprisonment and the accused was sentenced to 12 months’ jail, to run concurrently from his existing sentence of eight months from the date of arrest.

It is understood that an appeal was filed against the Magistrate’s decision over the sentencing and the use of the AI.

– Our Court however did not publish any information on this AI system. Based on reports, it is merely a system that recommends sentencing based on the decisions of other identical or similar cases. It is not an artificial intelligence per se but merely a software making a recommendation based on existing database. Lawyers have argued that such system should be accessible to them so that they can address any recommendation provided by the system. So far, there is no news of the Court allowing such access.

– With the outbreak of Covid-19 and the Movement Control Order, we can expect this to generate more cyber and IT related disputes in the Court. People are spending more time on the Internet and using more online services and implemented work from home policy. Interesting, the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within the Infected Local Areas) Regulations 2020, Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within the Infected Local Areas) (No. 2) Regulations 2020 and Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases (Measures Within the Infected Local Areas) (No. 3) Regulations 2020 declared e-commerce as one of the essential services that may operate during the Movement Control Order. Once the Movement Control Order is lifted, we can expect more and businesses adopting e-delivery of their businesses. This would result in development and licensing of more software which would definitely cause disputes, especially, involving the quality of the development and late delivery of software.

– Courts in the world are also commencing their virtual Court to ensure that the administrative of justice is not heavily disrupted by Covid-19. Our Courts have also adopted virtual and video conferencing hearings. Court documents will soon need to be crafted in a manner which suits online conferencing or allows a Judge to peruse it seamlessly, like reading a website. Interestingly, in Blackfriars Ltd, Re [2020] EWHC 845 (Ch), the High Court refused an adjournment based on the Covid-19 pandemic and directed that the trial proceed via video conferencing and electronic bundles.

First published on Digital News Asia on 14 April 2020 and 15 April 2020. This republished article has been amended to include further updates.

Introduction of Legal Technology Provision in the new Malaysian Legal Profession Act

The Bar Council recently submitted the draft of the new Legal Profession Act to the Attorney General. The new Act seeks to account for developing trends and technological innovation in the legal profession and also seeks to introduce provisions with the aim of being a fully self-governing Bar.

The new Act was drafted by the Committee to Reform the Legal Sector with the assistance of various working groups. I was appointed to assist Working Group 13 to draft the provision for “Legal Technology” which is now s. 35 of the new Act.

S. 35 of the new Act provides the following-

Legal technology

(1) For the purposes of this section:

“legal technology” means any technological product or service used or to be used in the provision of any service or any act which is within any function or responsibility of any advocate and solicitor, or places at the disposal of any other person the services of an advocate and solicitor;

“legal technology provider” means any person or entity that provides legal technology;

(2) The Bar Council may make rules and rulings for the regulation of any legal technology or legal technology provider, taking into account the promotion of technological innovations, public interest and the interests of members of the Malaysian Bar.

(3) The Bar Council shall have the power to exempt any legal technology or legal technology provider from any rules and rulings of the Bar Council and from section 33, with or without any condition, as may be deemed fit by the Bar Council from time to time.

(4) Any contravention of this section by any legal technology provider, shall result in the revocation of any approval or any exemption granted by the Bar Council.

(5) The Bar Council shall have the power to conduct any inquiry to identify or determine any contravention referred to in subsection (4), and may apply to the High Court by way of originating summons, to compel any person or entity to produce any document for the purpose of the inquiry.

(6) Where the Bar Council concludes that there has been a contravention of this section, the Bar Council shall have the power to apply to the High Court –

(a) for an order to restrain the legal technology provider from providing its product, service or solution;
(b) for an order to compel the relevant authority to disclose any further relevant information related to the contravention; and
(c) for an order to compel the relevant authority to restrain or limit access to such legal technological providers that contravene subsection (2).

(7) Any person or entity who contravenes subsection (2) shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not exceeding ten thousand ringgit and where such person or entity is an advocate and solicitor or limited liability law partnership, he or it shall also be liable to disciplinary proceedings under Part XI.

S. 35 seeks to regulate the provision of legal technology by legal technology service provider. It is noted that no approval is required to provide any legal technology or legal technology provider technology services unless Bar Council makes rules and rulings for it.

There had been proposal to introduce provision to require legal technology service provider to register itself with Bar Council before it can provide legal technology services. Fortunately, this provision was not introduced as it would stifle innovation. Businesses would be discouraged from creating any innovation for the legal profession if the barrier to entry is high or uncertain. Furthermore, certain technologies like accounting software are catered to all industries and not only legal industry. It would be difficult for the technology provider to divide itself between non-legal technology and legal technology.

There are two (2) parts to the definition of the term “legal technology”. Legal technology is defined as any technological product or service used or to be used-
(1) in the provision of any service or any act which is within any function or responsibility of any advocate and solicitor, or
(2) places at the disposal of any other person the services of an advocate and solicitor.

The first part basically covers all forms of legal technology used by an advocate and solicitor, whether in a form of a hardware and software, and could include legal information platform, artificial intelligence, accounting, software, mobile payment etc.

The second part basically covers lawyer-client matching service. Lawyer-client matching service is currently prohibited by s. 37 of the Legal Profession Act 1976. Lawyer matching service providers, Burgielaw and CanLaw were prohibited by the Bar Council to provide such services with a fee as it amounts to touting.

With the new s. 35(2) and (3), matching service may again be provided but with Bar Council’s approval.

Disclaimer: The views above are purely my personal views. They are not the official view or intent of the Bar Council.

Bread & Kaya: 2016 Cyberlaw cases – Cyber Court, Facebook fights and hacking

SEPT 1, 2016 marks the commencement of Malaysia’s first Cyber Court. Consequently, pending cases relating to cybercrime such as PP v Mohd Zaid bin Ibrahim (for a charge under s. 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 for allegedly making an offensive statement while calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Najib Razak) was transferred to the newly established Cyber Court before Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court Judge Tuan Zaman Mohd Noor. Practice Direction No. 5 Year 2016 was subsequently introduced to give a special category for cyber cases for both civil and criminal cases.

2016 saw a drop in civil litigation relating to publications on blogs, Twitter and online forums but civil litigation on Facebook thrived. Facebook became the top platform causing disputes between parties in Malaysia. However, Twitter is still a popular platform for criminal investigations as our Inspector General of Police a.k.a @KBAB51 frequently orders investigations against netizens on Twitter.

There is still no shortage of cases relating to disputes on blogs. In Khairulazwan Bin Harun v Mohd Rafizi Bin Ramli (Kuala Lumpur High Court Civil Suit No: 23NCVC-55-07 /2015), the Plaintiff, Deputy Leader of UMNO Youth Wing, filed an application for leave to initiate a contempt proceeding against the Defendant, Vice-President and Secretary-General of the People’s Justice Party (PKR), for sub judice.

The Defendant had apparently published an article in his blog issues which are pending in the Court. According to the Plaintiff, the contents of the article are such that they interfere with the due administration of justice and attacked the merits of the ongoing suit and cast aspersions on the independence and integrity of the judiciary and judicial process and therefore be an act of contempt.

The learned High Court Judge dismissed the application holding that there is no sub judice. The learned High Court Judge held that the general rule is that the law of contempt cannot be used to curtail public discussion of matters of public importance and public interest albeit that these matters may already be the subject of a court action.

In a case relating to a defamation action by a lawyer against the Defendant who is allegedly the infamous blogger, Papagomo, the High Court had rejected the Plaintiff’s action because he had failed to prove that the Defendant is Papagomo notwithstanding that the Plaintiff had called numerous witnesses to prove the same.

The Plaintiff even called a blogger who had allegedly met Papagomo in an event and had positively identified the Defendant as Papagomo, and also another blogger who had testified that Papagomo is the Defendant. The Court of Appeal ((Dato’ Sukri Bin Haji Mohamed v Wan Muhammad Azri bin Wan Deris (Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. D-02(NCVC)(W)-783-05/2014)) overruled the High Court on this point and held:-

In our view it is reasonable to infer that in the world of bloggers it is highly probable that a blogger knows the other blogger next to him or her. This probability is real because blogs are circulated in virtual space and they are widely read. It is not something that is unusual or unthinkable that sometimes bloggers do engage in virtual debate or argument and respond to each other over issues which attract public interest such as corruption and misuse of power or position by public officials or public figures

In the same case, it is interesting to note that a witness from the Forensic Legal Department of the Multimedia Commission testified that the Commission monitors blogs and articles published through them; and would investigate any offence under the Communication and Multimedia Act 1998 relating to ‘blog-blog lucah, jelek, mengancam dan sebagainya’ when it received complaint from internet users. He also testified that the Commission has data and information for each blog.

Facebook

In Maricel Cabangon Peralta Perimaloo v Riccardo Rovati & 3 Ors (Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. 23VCVC-18-03/2015), the Plaintiff, a former maid of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, sued the Defendants for defamation. The Plaintiff left the employment of the 1st and 2nd Defendants and filed a complaint with the Labour Office at Kuala Lumpur.

The Plaintiff alleged that, among others, the 2nd and 4th Defendant had published defamatory statements on Facebook. However, on the application of the Defendants, the High Court struck out the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants on the ground that the statements made were honest, based on facts and raised during a proceeding at the Labour Office at Kuala Lumpur and thus it is protected by absolute privilege and immune from an action for defamation.

In Chan Fei Yu & Yang Lain lwn. Siow Rong Jeing & Yang Lain (Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. 23NCVC-12-03/2015), the Plaintiffs sued the Defendants for publishing certain statements on Facebook that allegedly had defamed the Plaintiffs.

The 1st and 3rd Defendant had apparently published the 3rd Defendant’s allegation that the Plaintiffs had been negligent in grooming the former’s dog until it suffered injury. Further in this case, the Plaintiffs initiated contempt proceeding against the 3rd Defendant for allegedly providing fake residential addresses in his affidavits filed in Court.

The 3rd Defendant explained that one of the addresses was his former addresses whereas the other address is his mother’s residence. Fortunately for the 3rd Defendant, the Court accepted his explanation and held that the 3rd Defendant did not provide fake residential addresses to avoid service of the legal papers and interfere with or impede the administration of justice.

In Wedding Galore Sdn Bhd v. Rasidah Ahmad [2016] 6 CLJ 621, the High Court affirmed the Sessions Court’s decision in granting a public apology on Facebook and general damages of RM10,000 after the Defendant had taken the Plaintiff’s photographs from her Facebook account and published them in sales brochures for use at a wedding carnival without permission.

In Lim Yun Min & 7 Ors v Ng Han Seng & Anor (Shah Alam Sessions Court Suit No. B53F-7-03/2016), the Plaintiffs sued the Defendants for allegedly defaming them on Facebook. The Defendants applied to strike out the Plaintiffs’ claim for failing to:-

(1) state the Facebook URL address where the statements were published;

(2) state the exact time of publication of the statements; and

(3) identify or name the parties whom the Defendants are alleged to have published the statements and the Plaintiffs did not give the particulars of those parties who have read the alleged Impugned Statement.

The Plaintiffs have also failed to plead the statements in original language i.e Chinese.

The Sessions Court held that the Plaintiffs have failed to provide complete the Facebook web addresses and the identity of the parties that have read the statements. Instead of striking out the case, the Court used its discretion to order the Plaintiffs to amend their pleadings with cost payable to the Defendants.

In GGC v CCC & Anor (Kuala Lumpur High Court Divorce Petition No: 33-1415-08/2013), the Petitioner Wife (PW) sought damages from a lady (CoR) for allegedly committed adultery with her husband (RH). To prove adultery, PW relied on CoR’s Facebook postings to prove that RH and CoR had gone for a trip to various places. The Court stated:-

[84] The PW alluded to the CoR’s Facebook comments, status and photos uploaded by Co-R Pangkor Laut Resort, Maxim Hotel stay. However, there is no name or image of RH that appeared in any of these photos referred by PW. It was only by inference from some of the comments made by CoR’s friend that PW alleged RH was in those photos with the CoR. Nevertheless, none of these people who commented on the Facebook had been called by PW as witness. These comments or observation by public are therefore merely hearsay and cannot constitute evidence that this Court may rely on with respect to its truth.

[100] It is also in keeping with the times. In this day and age where with increased mobility, both physical and electronic and the easy access to new-fangled means of communication via the Internet, Wechat, WhatsApp, Skype, Blogs, Twitter and the like, there has been ushered in a whole new world of unlimited opportunities to communicate with anyone anywhere at anytime. With certain communication between the sexes, chemistry develops and opportunities to meet abound. While private investigators may be hired to track and collect evidence of a spouse’s infidelity, logistical costs have become prohibitive for many who have every reason to suspect a spouse is cheating on him or her but always a challenge to prove adultery. The time is both right and ripe for a realignment of the standard of proof even in adultery in a divorce petition to that of on a balance of probabilities.

Last year, I reported in Rina Simanjuntak v PP (Criminal Appeal No: P-05-256-09/2014), a Yahoo Messenger Chat log saved the life of Rina Simanjuntak who had been sentenced to death by the High Court for drug trafficking. In 2016, Facebook chat messages saved the life of a German by the name of Rudolf Tschernezow who was charged with drug trafficking. The High Court in PP v. Rudolf Tschernezow [2016] 1 LNS 654 held the Accused managed to prove that he is an innocent carrier using those messages [Update: Court of Appeal in PP v Rudolf Tschernezow (Criminal Appeal No J-05(LB)-345-12/2015) overturned the High Court’s decision).

In Norfariza Binti Harun v Dr Yusaidah Binti Yusof & Anor (Negeri Sembilan Sessions Court Civil Suit No. A53KP-04-11/2014), the Plaintiff sued the 1st Defendant for medical negligence while treating the Plaintiff. In support of the Plaintiff’s case, the Plaintiff had relied on various medical articles obtained from websites such as Healthline.com, webMD, Medicine Net.Com. However, the Court held that Plaintiff’s reliance on various websites to establish the effects of medications, misdiagnosis of Plaintiff’s symptoms and the prescriptions given is insufficient to establish the Plaintiff’s case without calling any medical expert. The Plaintiff’s case was therefore dismissed.

In Reka Setia Playground Sdn. Bhd. v Siow Wee Hong (Berniaga sebagai AZ Playground Builder) (Shah Alam High Court Suit No. 22NCVC-553-10/2015), the Plaintiff sued for copyright infringement over certain designs and works. In attempting to prove that the Plaintiff has no valid copyright claim over the design and works, the Defendant referred to a Prior Art Search Report.

The said Report utilised, among others, Google Search Results as a gauge or yard stick to determine whether or not there are contradicting copyright claims. The Court held that Google cannot be a credible copyright database. Google is merely an internet search engine and cannot be a determinant of any copyright claims or contradictions. Therefore, this Court held that it will not take into account any portions of the Search Report pertaining to Google Search Results.

On a slightly technical side, in the case of Wing Fah Enterprise Sdn Bhd v Matsushita Electronic Components (M) Sdn Bhd (Shah Alam High Court Suit No. 22-753-2005), the High Court held that s. 90A of the Evidence Act 1950 was not enacted to allow admissibility of documents downloaded from the internet. The High Court said that the meaning of computer producing the document must be a computer in the course of its ordinary use.

This refers to dedicated computers kept in organisations to do a certain function of general purport. This provision would cover for instance computers producing receipts on payments. In the present case the Plaintiff’s computers keeping details of accounts for instance would be covered by this provision. The production of the account sheets of the company from this computer would therefore be admissible under this provision. However information downloaded from the internet in no way form the ordinary use for the Plaintiff’s computers.

Computer Crimes Act 1997

Before 2016, it’s a rarity to find reported judgments relating to the Computer Crimes Act 1997. However, three (3) judgments relating to the same were published by the High Court in 2016.

In Basheer Ahmad Maula Sahul Hameed & Anor v Pendakwa Raya (Kuala Lumpur High Court Criminal Appeal No. 42(S)-44-06/2015), the High Court dismissed the appeal by the accused over their sentencing for, among others, stealing from the accounts of a few victims from the MH370 air flight tragedy using their ATM cards and online banking.

In Roslan bin Mohamad Som & Anor v Pendakwa Raya (Kuala Lumpur High Court Criminal Appeal No. 42(S)-69- 05/2014 and 42(S)–131–11/2014), the 2nd accused’s appeal over his conviction for making unauthorised modification to Tabung Haji’s database by inserting certain information therein was dismissed by the High Court.

However, in Pendakwa Raya v Vishnu Devarajan (Kuala Lumpur High Court Criminal Appeal No. 42(ORS)-60-07/2015), it was reported that the accused’s 36 charges under the Computer Crimes Act 1997 were struck out by the Sessions Court and subsequently upheld by the High Court as the charges failed to state the physical location where the alleged crime had happened. The High Court also held that an internet protocol (IP) address is not an address where a crime had happened in a charge sheet.

Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA)

Numerous netizens were subject to an investigation under s. 233 of the CMA (“s. 233”). Notable, a 19 year old boy, Muhammad Amirul Azwan Mohd Shakri, was given the maximum sentence of 1 year for a charge under s. 233 for insulting the Crown Prince of Johor on Facebook notwithstanding that he had pleaded guilty and was unrepresented.

The sentence was subsequently substituted the jail term and sent Amirul to the correction school. In another case, A 76 year old man who goes by the name of “Pa Ya” was arrested and remanded for 3 days for uploading an allegedly insulting photo of Prime Minister Najib Razak. Activist Fahmi Reza was also charged under s. 233 for posting an edited image of Prime Minister Najib Razak on his Instagram account.

On the independent media side, the access to The Malaysian Insider had been blocked pursuant to the direction of the Malaysia Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) vide its powers under s. 263 (2) of the CMA. The MCMC frequently uses the said s. 263 to direct its licensees (i.e. Internet Service Providers) to deny access of netizens to websites to prevent the commission or attempted commission of an offence in Malaysia.

Further, Malaysiakini’s editor-in-chief Steven Gan and KiniTV Sdn Bhd were also charged under s. 233 for airing an allegedly offensive video on KiniTV’s website. The alleged offensive video was of a press conference held by Khairuddin Abu Hassan titled “Khairuddin: Apandi Ali is not fit to be AG and he should quit immediately. Steven Gan was also charged on his capacity as a director of KiniTV Sdn Bhd pursuant to s. 244 of the CMA.

Others

In an interesting case regarding Groupon (an e-commerce marketplace), a user of Groupon Malaysia purchased a tour package vide its platform from one of Groupon’s merchant. However, the said merchant allegedly cancelled the tour and no refund was made by the said merchant to the user. Groupon, however, made a refund to the user. Dissatisfied, the user demanded that Groupon bear the payment he made to Groupon’s merchant.

Groupon rejected the demand and the user made a complaint to the Consumer Tribunal. The Consumer Tribunal held in favour of the user and held Groupon liable for the payment to its merchant. Groupon thereafter filed an application for judicial review against the Consumer Tribunal’s decision in Groupon Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna & Anor (Kuala Lumpur High Court Judicial Review Application No. 25-332-12/2015)

In the said application, Groupon stated that, among others, that it is merely an online marketing platform and never an agent of the travel company and pointed out that this was highlighted in its terms and conditions – as agreed by the user.

According to the Court’s records, the High Court overturned the Consumer Tribunal’s decision. Unfortunately, no grounds of judgment had been published. But one can assume that an online marketing platform is not necessarily liable for its merchants’ actions.

There are some interesting developments in the realm of cyber and electronic world not seen in Malaysia.

In Lancashire County Council v M & Ors (Rev 1) [2016] EWFC 9, Mr Justice Peter Jackson and published online is thought to be the first in English legal history to incorporate an emoji, or web symbol, to explain a point of evidence. In paragraph 27(13), the Court said:-

In the United States case of In the Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized during the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203 (popularly known as the Apple v. FBI case), the FBI requested the Court to compel Apple, Inc to assist the FBI to access an Apple phone found in a car of one of the San Bernardino shooters.

The FBI had requested Apple, Inc to remove some features from its phone such as the auto erase function, the requirement for passwords to be entered manually and any software-invoked delay-upon-failure functions. Apple, Inc contested the request heavily. However, the FBI dropped its case after it found other ways to access the phone.

Closing

We can expect that amendments to the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 to be introduced this year. The amendments of the CMA were supposed to be tabled in the 2016 Dewan Rakyat sitting but it never came to light. It is still unclear what are the exact proposed changes. However, we do know that the punishment for contravention of s. 233 will be increased.

There should also be an increase of harassment case be brought to Court with the advent of tort of harassment (Mohd Ridzwan bin Abdul Razak v Asmah Binti HJ. Mohd Nor (Federal Court Civil Appeal No 01(f)-13-06/2013 (W)). One may bring a person to Court with a help of a lawyer without relying on the authorities.

The cost of hiring a lawyer should now decrease with the advent of many new start-up law firms in Malaysia. Furthermore, there are now online platforms that can match lawyers and members of public such as BurgieLaw and CanLaw.

First published on Digital News Asia on 2 March 2017 (Part 1) and 3 March 2017 (Part 2)

Don’t be penny-wise, startups: lawyers

I gave on a talk on Intellectual Property Law for Startup at a firechat sessions titled “Bridge the Gap between Startups and the Law” organised by BurgieLaw held at the Malaysian Global Innovation and Creativity Centre (MaGIC) on 9 May 2016.

Subsequent to the firechat session, I was featured in The Star in their article “Don’t be penny-wise, startups: lawyers“. An extract of the article produce below:-

Intellectual Property lawyer Foong Cheng Leong said he often got queries from startups on how to protect their ideas.

“It’s usually quite reasonable, but sometimes they try to protect things that can’t be protected,” he said, adding that abstract ideas and business concepts could not be shielded with a patent.

He advised companies to research what they expected from a lawyer, as well as the lawyer’s credentials, before arranging a meeting. This would ensure the lawyer had the correct skill sets.

He noted that many local lawyers were geared to common transactions like property and sale and purchase agreements, and not many had explored tech-related laws.

With 11 years in the industry, Foong said he had seen his share of cases where businesses try to D-I-Y and drafted their contracts without going to a lawyer, only to end up going to a lawyer anyway after things went wrong.

He said while filing a trademark costs around from RM2,000, going to court over a logo or brand name dispute could easily cost more than RM100,000 and take between nine months and a year.

Sometimes running lean also means not being penny-wise and pound-foolish.

ITC Legal Tech Forum: Bringing Lawyers and Technology Together

KLBC ITC Legal Tech Forum: Bringing Lawyers and Technology Together on 19 January 2016

The KLBC Information Technology Committee will be organising a one-day Legal-Tech Forum on Tuesday, 19 January 2016 from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm at the KL Bar Auditorium, 4th Floor, Wisma Hangsam, No.1 Jalan Hang Lekir, 50000 Kuala Lumpur.

Lawyers and technology have become undeniably intertwined as the legal marketplace becomes more competitive. We would like to bring together skills from the legal and tech fields to share their knowledge with us on how lawyers will modernize their firms in 2016.

The Forum will cover practical legal-tech issues and inform and educate lawyers on technology and innovation for the legal field. The purpose is to provide the participants with the knowledge on essential legal-tech issues as well as introducing tools and ways which can be used by lawyers for efficiency, improving client service, as well as just keeping up with the times.

Speakers are Edmund Bon Tai Soon, Fahri Azzat, Richard Wee Thiam Seng, Jason Kay and Mohd Izzat Ghazali (Gizzat).

Certain tech startups will also provide a short introduction of their services and how their services can assist lawyers in their practice.

Participating legal tech startups
– Be Lazee – making commerce conversational again with concierge and on-demand services.(http://www.bemalas.com/)
– BurgieLaw – to A calendar module software to schedule an appointment with lawyers. (http://www.burgielaw.com/)
– Firegent – an easy way to automatically identify, sort and extract data from documents to create reports, charts, perform – analysis and retrieve them quickly. (http://firegent.com/)
– GiveReceipt – a web app that lets you quickly create and send out e-receipts to your customers. (http://www.givereceipt.com/)
– Intelllex – a productivity suite for lawyers. Its core technology is an intelligent search engine. Other features include a law notes taking application and a knowledge management application. (https://www.facebook.com/intelllex/)
Office Parrots – a career platform for young lawyers to find out more about firms they can work with and to bring transparency to the market. (http://www.officeparrots.com/)
– ZeptoExpress – an online platform to get dispatch services in real time.
– SecondCRM – How Business Automation Improves Client Services for your Law Practice. (http://www.secondcrm.com/)

To register, please visit here

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