

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN KUALA LUMPUR  
(COMMERCIAL DIVISION)  
IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA  
SUIT NO: 22IP-33-06/2015

BETWEEN

AKTIF PERUNDING SDN BHD

... PLAINTIFF

AND

ZNVA & ASSOCIATES SDN BHD

... DEFENDANT

JUDGMENT

(after trial)

A. Introduction

1. This case discussed the novel question of whether a company has “*moral rights*” in a work under s 25(2) of the Copyright Act 1987 (**CA**).
2. Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (**UTM**) had appointed Ahmad Zaki Sdn. Bhd. (**Main Contractor**) as the main contractor for the construction of UTM’s student accommodation in Kuala Lumpur (**Project**).

3. The plaintiff company (**Plaintiff**) was appointed by the Main Contractor as the Mechanical and Electrical Engineering Consultant (**Consultant**) for the Project. As Consultant, the Plaintiff had produced certain Mechanical and Electrical Engineering drawings (**Drawings**). In the “*Title Block*” of the Drawings (**Title Block**), it was stated, among others, that the Plaintiff was the Mechanical and Electrical Engineer (**M & E Engineer**) for the Project.
4. The Plaintiff’s appointment as Consultant was subsequently terminated by the Main Contractor and the defendant company (**Defendant**) was appointed by the Main Contractor as the Consultant.

**B. Issues**

5. The following questions, among others, arise in this case:
  - (1) who is the owner of copyright in the Drawings? This issue concerns -
    - (a) whether the Main Contractor owns copyright in the Drawings under s 26(2)(a) CA because the Main Contractor had commissioned the Plaintiff to prepare the Drawings; and
    - (b) whether the statement in the Title Block that the Plaintiff was the M & E Engineer, constituted evidence that the Plaintiff was the author of the Drawings and was thereby the owner of the copyright in the Drawings pursuant to s 26(1) CA;

- (2) if the Plaintiff has no copyright in the Drawings, does the Plaintiff have moral rights in the Drawings under s 25(2)(a), (b)(i) and (ii) CA on the ground that the Plaintiff is the author of the Drawings? This will entail a discussion on whether s 25 CA can confer moral rights on an author of a work which is a company; and
- (3) did the Defendant commit fraud on the Plaintiff by, among others, replacing the Plaintiff's name as M & E Engineer in the Title Block with the Defendant's name and by subsequently using the Drawings for the Project without the Plaintiff's knowledge and consent? In deciding whether the Defendant had defrauded the Plaintiff in this case, can the court consider the fact that Encik Muhammad bin Uda (**Encik Muhammad**), the Defendant's director and mechanical engineer, had been found guilty of a disciplinary offence in respect of the Project by the Disciplinary Committee (**DC**) [constituted under s 14A(1) of the Registration of Engineers Act 1967 (**REA**)]?

### C. Background

6. The Main Contractor's "*Letter of Intent*" dated 27.9.2013 to the Plaintiff stated, among others, as follows:
  - (1) the Main Contractor expressed its intention to appoint the Plaintiff as Consultant; and

(2) the Main Contractor and Plaintiff would negotiate on the terms to be included in the agreement between the Main Contractor and Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff agreed to the Main Contractor's Letter of Intent by signing on the Letter of Intent.

7. As the Consultant, the Plaintiff had carried out Mechanical and Electrical Engineering works for the Project. For this purpose, the Plaintiff's representatives were required to meet UTM's employees (**Meetings**).
8. The Plaintiff's director and mechanical engineer, Encik Sjaiful Anwar bin Sjamsuddin (**Encik Sjaiful**), could not attend the Meetings. As the Main Contractor wanted the Consultant's engineers to attend the Meetings, the Main Contractor introduced Encik Muhammad to the Plaintiff and recommended for Encik Muhammad to assist the Plaintiff in the Project.
9. The Plaintiff appointed Encik Muhammad to assist the Plaintiff in the Project as the Plaintiff's "*Associate Director*". Encik Muhammad had assisted the Plaintiff in the Project by –
  - (1) assisting Plaintiff's team of engineers to prepare the Drawings; and
  - (2) attending Meetings on behalf of the Plaintiff.

10. The Plaintiff completed the Drawings and handed the Drawings to the Main Contractor.
11. In early November 2013, before the completion of the Project, the Main Contractor's General Manager (Mechanical and Engineering Division), Encik Nazarul bin Hashim (**Encik Nazarul**), had orally informed Encik Mohd. Mazlan bin Baharuddin (**Encik Mazlan**), the Plaintiff's Managing Director and Electrical Engineer, that the Main Contractor had decided to terminate the appointment of the Plaintiff as the Consultant (**Termination**). Encik Mazlan then informed Encik Nazarul that the Main Contractor was required to pay to the Plaintiff an "*abortive fee*" as a result of the Termination.
12. The Plaintiff sent a letter dated 6.11.2013 to the Main Contractor which stated that the Main Contractor should pay RM933,722.52 to the Plaintiff as the Plaintiff's "*abortive fee*" due to the Termination. The Plaintiff then informed the Main Contractor by a letter dated 10.12.2013 that the Plaintiff would reduce the Plaintiff's "*abortive fee*" to RM300,000.00.
13. By a letter dated 10.12.2013, the Main Contractor informed the Plaintiff of the Termination and consequently -
  - (1) the Plaintiff should forward "*all designs, drawings and other documents and materials related to the Project*" (**Project Documents**) to the Main Contractor;

- (2) all intellectual property in the Project Documents belonged to the Main Contractor; and
  - (3) as a “*token of appreciation*”, the Main Contractor would only reimburse the Plaintiff with a sum of RM120,000.00 only.
14. The Plaintiff sent a letter dated 12.12.2013 to the Main Contractor which stated, among others –
- (1) the Plaintiff would insist on RM933,722.52 as the Plaintiff’s “*abortive fee*”; and
  - (2) the Main Contractor had no right to use the Project Documents as the Plaintiff had intellectual property in the Project Documents. The Main Contractor could only use the Project Documents when the Plaintiff issued a “*Letter of Release*” after the Main Contractor had agreed on the Plaintiff’s “*abortive fee*”.
15. The Plaintiff refused to issue a Letter of Release which would enable the Main Contractor to appoint another M & E Engineer (**2<sup>nd</sup> Engineer**) to replace the Plaintiff as Consultant. In view of the dispute between the Main Contractor and the Plaintiff (**Dispute**), the Main Contractor applied to the Board of Engineers (**Board**) by way of a letter dated 8.5.2014 for –

- (1) the Board to act as a stakeholder regarding fees to be paid by Main Contractor to Plaintiff (**Stakeholder**). For this purpose, the Main Contractor proposed to deposit a sum of RM120,000.00 with the Board; and
  - (2) the Board to appoint a mediator to resolve the Dispute.
16. By way of a letter dated 24.6.2014, the Board informed the Main Contractor that the Board would act as a Stakeholder in the Dispute if the Main Contractor would deposit a sum of RM300,000.00 (**Sum**) with the Board. The Main Contractor subsequently deposited the Sum with the Board.
17. The Board sent a letter dated 14.7.2014 to the Plaintiff which stated, among others –
  - (1) as the Main Contractor had deposited the Sum with the Board, the Plaintiff was directed to issue a Letter of Release to the Main Contractor; and
  - (2) the Board would release the Sum upon receipt a final arbitral award regarding the Dispute.
18. The Plaintiff issued a Letter of Release dated 17.7.2014 to enable the Main Contractor to appoint the 2<sup>nd</sup> Engineer.
19. The Plaintiff did not know that –

- (1) the Main Contractor had appointed the Defendant as the 2<sup>nd</sup> Engineer of the Project;
  - (2) the Defendant had replaced the Plaintiff's name as M & E Engineer in the Title Block with the Defendant's name; and
  - (3) the Defendant had used the Drawings for the Project.
20. The Plaintiff had complained to the Board that Encik Muhammad had acted as the 2<sup>nd</sup> Engineer of the Project without the Plaintiff's consent and the Plaintiff's Letter of Release. The DC had found Encik Muhammad guilty of a disciplinary offence and had punished him as follows:
- (1) Encik Muhammad's registration as a "*registered Person*" (defined in s 2 REA) had been suspended for 6 months; and
  - (2) Encik Muhammad had been imposed a fine of RM30,000.00

**(DC's Decision).**

Encik Muhammad did not appeal to the Appeal Board (constituted under s 20 REA) against the DC's Decision.

#### D. This suit

21. In this action, the Plaintiff claimed for damages from the Defendant on the following 2 grounds:

- (1) the Defendant had infringed the Plaintiff's moral rights in the Drawings under s 25(2) CA; and
- (2) the Defendant had defrauded the Plaintiff by, among others, replacing the Plaintiff's name as M & E Engineer in the Title Block with the Defendant's name and by subsequently using the Drawings in the Project without the Plaintiff's knowledge and consent.

#### E. Invitation of Board as *amicus curiae*

22. During the trial of this case, I realized that the view of the Board on the nature and importance of Title Block, was needed to decide this case justly. I then invited learned counsel for the Plaintiff and Defendant to consider whether this court should invite the Board's learned counsel as an *amicus curiae* in this case.

23. Mr. Rajindar Singh Veriah, learned counsel for the Plaintiff (**Mr. Rajindar**), and Mr. K. Selva Kumaran, the Defendant's learned counsel (**Mr. Selva**), agreed to the court's proposal to invite the Board's learned counsel as an *amicus curiae* in this case. Mr. Rajindar and Mr. Selva further agreed for 7 questions to be presented for the Board's view (**7 Questions**).

24. The 7 Questions are –

- (1) what is the purpose and function of a Title Block?;
- (2) what is the effect of a Letter of Release and does it have retrospective effect?;
- (3) whether a Title Block constitutes a reservation of an author's rights in the Drawings;
- (4) whether the author of the Drawings is the name of the -
  - (a) engineer in the Title Block; or
  - (b) person stated in the description "*Drawn By*" (*Dilukis Oleh*);
- (5) if the answer to the above fourth question is "yes", whether a change of the name in the Title Block constitutes a breach of the author's moral rights under s 25 CA;
- (6) if the answer to the above fifth question is "yes", whether existing law, among others, reg. 24 of the Registration of Engineers Regulations 1990 (**RER**), by-law 4 of the Building (Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur) By-Laws 1985 [**By-Laws (KL)**] and Uniform Building By-Laws 1984 (**UBBL**), provide a complete defence to the Defendant for failing to acknowledge that the original author of the Drawings was the Plaintiff; and

(7) whether a principal of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Engineer (appointed by the Main Contractor), can sign the Drawings under the Plaintiff's Title Block in order to comply with By-Laws (KL) and by-law 7 UBBL.

25. It is not disputed that the court has the power to invite a learned counsel to be an *amicus curiae* (friend of the court). I refer to Sulaiman Daud JC's (as he then was) decision in the High Court case of **Tai Chou Yu v Ian Chin Hon Ching** [2002] 5 MLJ 518, at 523-524, as follows:

***"Who is an amicus curiae? In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's The Law Lexicon (2nd Ed, 1997), amicus curiae is defined as a friend of the court, being a person who voluntarily or on invitation of the court, and not on the instruction of any party helps the court in any judicial proceedings."***

(emphasis added).

26. I exercise my discretion to invite the Board's learned counsel to act as an *amicus curiae* in this case (**Court's Invitation**) for the following reasons:

(1) I am not able to find any previous Malaysian case which has decided on the effect of Title Block on the authorship and ownership of copyright in the Drawings;

- (2) a decision regarding the effect of Title Block on the authorship and ownership of copyright in the Drawings, will have an effect on the engineering profession in particular and the construction industry in general;
  - (3) the Board is a statutory body established under s 3(1) REA with the function, among others, “*to determine and regulate the conduct and ethics of the engineering profession*” [s 4(1)(f) REA]. Accordingly, the Board is the appropriate entity to assist this court on whether the Title Block has any effect on the authorship and ownership of copyright in the Drawings; and
  - (4) both parties in this case have agreed to the Court’s Invitation. In fact, the parties’ learned counsel have agreed for 7 Questions to be presented for the Board’s view.
27. Based on the above reasons, I directed my learned Deputy Registrar to issue the Court’s Invitation. The Board had kindly accepted the Court’s Invitation and had appointed Mr. Richard Kok Chi Wei (**Mr. Kok**) to act as an *amicus curiae* in this case. Consequently, Mr. Kok had filed a written submission on the 7 Questions.

## F. Who has copyright in Drawings?

### F(1). Eligibility for copyright

28. The Drawings do not constitute a “*literary work*” within the meaning of s 3(a) to (h) CA. The Drawings however fall within the meaning of a “*graphic work*” in s 3(a) CA (*drawing*). In s 3(a) CA, “*artistic work*” means, among others, a graphic work. Accordingly, the Drawings constitute an “*artistic work*”. In the Federal Court case of **Dura-Mine Sdn Bhd v Elster Metering Ltd & Anor** [2015] 1 CLJ 887, at paragraph 14, Jeffrey Tan FCJ held as follows:

“[14] *It is settled that technical drawings are artistic works eligible for copyright (see Lau Foo Sun v Government of Malaysia [1974] 1 MLJ 28; TR Hamzah & Yeang Sdn Bhd v Lazar Sdn Bhd [1985] 2 MLJ 45; and Peko Wallsend Operations Ltd & Ors v Linatex Process Rubber Bhd and another action [1993] 1 MLJ 225).*”

(emphasis added).

29. I am satisfied that the Drawings are eligible for copyright. This decision is based on the following reasons:

- (1) the Drawings is an “*artistic work*” which is eligible for copyright under s 7(1)(c) CA;

- (2) there is evidence adduced in this case to show that the Plaintiff has expended sufficient effort to make the Drawings “*original in character*” within the meaning of s 7(3)(a) CA; and
- (3) as required by s 7(3)(b) CA, the Drawings have been reduced to “*material form*” (as defined in s 3 CA).

**F(2). Whether copyright subsists in Drawings**

30. It is clear that copyright subsists in the Drawings due to one or more of the following reasons:

- (1) as explained below, the author of the Drawings was the Plaintiff. Section 10(1) CA provides that copyright shall subsist in a work eligible for copyright when the author is a “*qualified person*”. In relation to a body corporate, s 3(b) CA defines a “*qualified person*” as “*a body corporate established in Malaysia and constituted or vested with legal personality under the laws of Malaysia*”. It is clear that the Plaintiff, as a private limited company incorporated under the Companies Act 1965, is a “*qualified person*” within the meaning of s 3(b) CA. As such, copyright subsists in the Drawings by virtue of s 10(1) CA;
- (2) according to the Plaintiff’s evidence, the Drawings were first published in Malaysia. Hence, copyright subsists in the Drawings under s 10(2)(a) CA; **and/or**

- (3) it is not disputed that the Drawings were made in Malaysia. Hence, copyright subsists in the Drawings pursuant to s 10(3) CA.

**F(3). Who was author of Drawings?**

31. The relevant part of s 26 CA is reproduced as follows:

“s 26. ***First ownership of copyright***

(1) ***Copyright conferred by section 10 shall vest initially in the author.***

(2) ***Notwithstanding subsection 27(6), where a work -***

(a) ***is commissioned by a person who is not the author's employer under a contract of service or apprenticeship; or***

(b) ***not having been so commissioned, is made in the course of the author's employment,***

***the copyright shall be deemed to be transferred to the person who commissioned the work or the author's employer, subject to any agreement between the parties excluding or limiting such transfer.***

(3) ***Copyright conferred by section 11 shall vest initially in the Government, Government organization or international body and not in the author.***

(4) ***Subject to subsection (3) -***

(a) ***the name on a work purporting to be the name of its author shall be considered as such, unless the contrary is proved;***  
...”

(emphasis added).

32. I am satisfied that the Plaintiff was the “*author*” of the Drawings for the following reasons:

- (1) the Plaintiff had given evidence that the Plaintiff’s engineering team was the “*artist*” of the Drawings within the meaning of the term “*author*” in s 3(c) CA; and
- (2) the Title Block initially stated the Plaintiff’s name as M & E Engineer. As rightly submitted by Mr. Kok, a Title Block provides information on the ownership and authorship of the drawing in question. Accordingly, the Plaintiff was the “*author*” of the Drawings according to s 26(4)(a) CA.

**F(4). Whether Plaintiff or Main Contractor has copyright in Drawings**

33. Despite the fact that the Plaintiff is the author of the Drawings, I am of the view that the Main Contractor owns the copyright in the Drawings. This decision is premised on the following reasons:

(1) s 26(1) CA provides that copyright conferred by s 10 CA “*shall vest initially in the author*”. It is clear that authorship of a work does not conclusively vest copyright in the author. It was decided in **Dura-Mine**, in paragraph 13, as follows -

*“[13] When read together, ss 7, 10 and 26(1) provide that ownership of the copyright of a work eligible for copyright shall subsists initially with the author.”*

(emphasis added);

(2) there are 2 circumstances provided by s 26(2)(a) and (b) CA wherein an author of a work does not have copyright in the work. I cite the judgment of Steve LK Shim J (as he then was) in the High Court case of **Yeoh Kee Aun v PI Capital Asset Management Sdn Bhd (formerly known as PI Capital Research Sdn Bhd)** [2000] 1 LNS 132, at p. 12, as follows -

*“A person can be an author of a copyright work and yet does not own it. This is evident from s. 26 Copyright Act which states that an employee who is the author of a copyright is not the owner of the copyright if the subject copyright is made in the course of the author’s employment or pursuant to a commission.”*

(emphasis added);

(3) the word “*commissioned*” in s 26(2) CA is not defined in CA. I refer to the following cases from New Zealand (NZ) and United Kingdom (UK) which have explained the word “*commissioned*” in their legislation –

(a) **PS Johnson & Associates Ltd v Bucko Enterprises Ltd & Ors** [1975] 1 NZLR 311 is a decision of Chilwell J in the Supreme Court of NZ (at that time, the Supreme Court of NZ was a court of first instance) regarding the interpretation of the then s 9(3) of NZ’s Copyright Act 1962 [**CA 1962 (NZ)**]. Section 9(3) CA 1962 (NZ) provided as follows -

*“Subject to subsection (2) of this section, where a person commissions the taking of a photograph, or the making of a painting, drawing, engraving, or sculpture and pays or agrees to pay for it in money or money’s worth, and the work is made in pursuance of that commission, the person who so commissioned the work shall be entitled to any copyright subsisting therein by virtue of this Part of this Act.”*

(emphasis added).

The word “*commission*” was not defined in CA 1962 (NZ) and had been explained in **Johnson & Associates Ltd**, at p. 317-318, as follows -

***“However, it does not seem to me to be necessary to apply strict contractual conceptions to the interpretation of s 9(3) [CA 1962 (NZ)]. The verb "commission" is defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as follows:***

***"(1) To furnish with a commission or legal warrant.***

***(2) To empower; to entrust with an officer or duty.***

***(3) To send on a mission.***

***(4) To give a commission or order to or for.”***

***The evidence is as plain as can be that Mr Johnson, acting for his company, placed an order for the product drawing: the company accordingly commissioned it. The company also quite definitely paid for it. The product drawing was made in pursuance of that commission. In my judgment, applying the ordinary meaning of the words of s 9(3) to the facts of this case, it is perfectly plain that the plaintiff company is entitled to the copyright subsisting in the product drawing.”***

(emphasis added);

- (b) in **Plix Products Ltd v Frank M Winstone (Merchants) & Ors** [1986] FSR 63, at 86, Prichard J decided as follows in the High Court of NZ regarding the meaning of “*commission*” in s 9(3) CA 1962 (NZ) -

***“Without proof of a prior commissioning, payment for the work - in whatever form - is of no consequence. Commissioning means ordering. In this context it means more than requesting or encouraging. It connotes an obligation to pay. Not just to pay for the finished products if and when they are purchased, but to pay for the very article in which the copyright resides irrespective of whether any of the finished products are purchased.”***

(emphasis added).

The above decision by Prichard J had been affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeal of NZ in [1986] FSR 608 (except for a variation of the injunction granted by Prichard J);

- (c) Prichard J’s decision regarding the meaning of “*commission*” in **Plix Products**, has been followed by the following cases in UK –
- (i) Mickleham J’s judgment in the High Court case of **Applecore Ltd v Cooper** [1993] FSR 286, at 298, regarding the then s 4(3) of UK’s Copyright Act 1956 [**CA 1956 (UK)**]. Section 4(3) CA 1956 (UK) is similar to s 9(3) CA 1962 (NZ); and
  - (ii) the decision of Waller LJ (as he then was) in the Court of Appeal in **Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding & Ors** [2004] RPC 24, at paragraphs 29-33. It is to be noted that **Ultraframe** concerned the meaning of the word “*commission*” [defined in

s 263(1) of UK's Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA)] which is used in s 215(2) CDPA (regarding the ownership of "*design right*"); and

- (d) **Pacific Software Technology Ltd & Anor v Perry Group Ltd & Anor** [2004] 1 NZLR 164 is a judgment of NZ's Court of Appeal delivered by Hammond J regarding the present s 21(3) of the Copyright Act 1994 [**CA 1994 (NZ)**]. Section 21(3) CA 1994 (NZ) provides as follows –

"21(3)        *Where –*

- (a) ***A person commissions, and pays or agrees to pay for, the taking of a photograph or the making of a computer program, painting, drawing, diagram, map, chart, plan, engraving, model, sculpture, film, or sound recording; and***
- (b) ***The work is made in pursuance of that commission, –***  
  
***that person is the first owner of any copyright in the work.***"

(emphasis added).

In **Pacific Software Technology**, at paragraphs 52-60, Hammond J explained the term "*commission*" in s 21(3) CA 1994 (NZ) as follows -

***“[52] Whether a work is “commissioned”; what the scope of that commission is; and the date on which the commission arises are all necessarily questions of fact in each case.***

***[53] Patently, the better practice is to have a written agreement, and software developers and purchasers would be well advised to see that sound industry contracting procedures are put in place. Be that as it may, inevitably there will be cases, such as the present, in which the exigencies of the moment, or a lack of “best practice” will see parties fail to attend to the obvious.***

***[54] Where there is no specific agreement, the law is now well settled, although it can be difficult to apply.***

***[55] First, to “commission” simply means to “order” or “request”.***

***[56] Secondly, this commissioning must be antecedent to the work. It must have been arrived at before the work is made.***

***[57] Thirdly, s 21 requires, in terms, a commission and an agreement to pay. Whilst an antecedent commissioning does not necessarily imply an obligation to pay, usually it will do so. And the very existence of a payment obligation can lend force to the notion***

*of the commission itself. An agreement to pay can be express or implied. In **Alwinco Products Ltd v Crystal Glass Industries Ltd** [1985] 1 NZLR 716, this Court thought it sufficient that it be established that the work is to be paid for. **For the purposes of a commission there need not necessarily be agreement as to the precise amount to be paid. And the authors of Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, The Modern Law of Copyright and Designs, Vol 1 (2nd ed, 1995) at para 11.50 cite with approval P S Johnson & Associates Ltd v Bucko Enterprises Ltd** [1975] 1 NZLR 311 for the proposition that there can be an implied commissioning arrangement “where it can only be assumed that [the work] would ultimately be paid for”. That said, matters can be left so vague that the supposed commission becomes unenforceable. (For a reported instance of this kind, see **Leah v Two Worlds Publishing Co Ltd** [1951] Ch 393.)*

*[58] Fourthly, this payment is a quid pro quo for the copyright: that is, the making of the copyright work, not the physical embodiment of the work itself.*

*[59] Fifthly, the copyright in the commissioned work belongs to the commissioning party so soon as part of it is done. That is, the commission applies to incomplete as well as complete works.*

*[60] Sixthly, it will be apparent from the foregoing that **although it is an agreement of a kind, a commission is closer to a term of art which is employed in the copyright area for the resolution of first ownership issues. To put this another way, the notion of a commission is sui generis to copyright law. It involves the Court finding an arrangement of the requisite character between the parties, and what the terms of it are. The very existence of the commission may be inferred.***

(emphasis added).

Subject to one caveat, I am of the view that the above New Zealand cases on the meaning of “*commission*” can be resorted to in the interpretation of the word “*commissioned*” in our s 26(2) CA. The caveat is that s 9(3) CA 1962 (NZ) and s 21(3) CA 1994 (NZ) provide for an additional statutory requirement (payment or agreement to pay by the commissioning party to the author of the work in question) (**Additional Requirement**). Our s 26(2) CA does not have the Additional Requirement;

- (4) I make a finding of fact that the Main Contractor’s Letter of Intent dated 27.9.2013 (accepted by the Plaintiff) constituted a “*commission*” under s 26(2) CA by the Main Contractor to the Plaintiff to produce the Drawings. This finding is supported by the following reasons –

- (a) there was no express contract between the Main Contractor and Plaintiff that the copyright in the Drawings would vest in the Plaintiff;
- (b) the Main Contractor's Letter of Intent was an "order" for the Plaintiff to prepare the Drawings within the ordinary and dictionary meaning of the word "*commission*" - please see **Johnson & Associates Ltd, Plix Products and Pacific Software Technology**;
- (c) the Main Contractor's Letter of Intent constituted a "*request*" by the Main Contractor for the Plaintiff to produce the Drawings - please see **Pacific Software Technology**;
- (d) the Main Contractor's Letter of Intent was antecedent to the production of the Drawings - please see **Pacific Software Technology**;
- (e) there need not be an agreement for the precise sum of money to be paid for the Drawings by the Main Contractor to the Plaintiff - please see **Pacific Software Technology**; and
- (f) the Main Contractor's commission to the Plaintiff, applied to the Plaintiff's incomplete work in the Project - please see **Pacific Software Technology**; and

(5) even if I have erred in deciding that the Main Contractor's Letter of Intent constituted an express commission by the Main Contractor for the Plaintiff to prepare the Drawings, in the alternative, there was an implied commissioning by way of the Main Contractor's Letter of Intent - please see **Pacific Software Technology**.

34. Mr. Kok had submitted that a Title Block is not necessarily a reservation of copyright in the drawing in question because this is not the "*express function*" of the Title Block. In this case, the Title Block did not reserve any copyright in the Drawings in favour of the Plaintiff. Even if the Title Block in this case had expressly reserved copyright in the Drawings in favour of the Plaintiff, such a reservation has no legal effect. This is because the Main Contractor has copyright in the Drawings by reason of operation of law [application of s 26(2)(a) CA] and the contents of the Title Block cannot therefore lawfully deprive the Main Contractor of such a copyright.

**G. Can Plaintiff have moral rights in Drawings under s 25(2) CA?**

35. The relevant part of s 25 CA reads as follows:

"s 25     ***Moral rights***

(1)       *For the purposes of this section, the word "name" includes initials or monograms.*

(2)       ***Subject to this section, where copyright subsists in a work, no person may, without the consent of the author, or, after the author's***

**death, of his personal representative, do or authorize the doing of any of the following acts:**

- (a) the presentation of the work, by any means whatsoever, without identifying the author or under a name other than that of the author; and**
- (b) the distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work if the distortion, mutilation or modification -**
  - (i) significantly alters the work; and**
  - (ii) is such that it might reasonably be regarded as adversely affecting the author's honour or reputation.**

...

**(4) The author or, after his death, his personal representative, may exercise the rights conferred by this section notwithstanding that the copyright in the work is not at the time of the act complained of, vested in the author or personal representative, as the case may be.**

**(5) Any contravention or threatened contravention of this section in respect of a work shall be actionable at the suit of the author of the work or, if he is dead, at the suit of his personal representative, as a breach of statutory duty.**

**(6) Any damages recovered under this section by a personal representative in respect of a contravention committed in relation to a work after the death of the author of the work shall devolve as part of**

***the author's estate, as if the right of action had subsisted and had been vested in him immediately before his death.***

...”

(emphasis added).

36. Mr. Rajindar had submitted, among others, as follows:

- (1) notwithstanding the Plaintiff's Letter of Release and the fact that copyright in the Drawings vests in the Main Contractor, the Plaintiff nevertheless has moral rights in the Drawings under s 25(2) CA because the Plaintiff is the “*author*” of the Drawings as understood in s 3(g) CA; and
- (2) reliance had been placed on, among others, the following –
  - (a) the judgment of Azahar Mohamed J (as he then was) in the High Court case of **Syed Ahmad Jamal v Dato' Bandar Kuala Lumpur** [2011] 2 CLJ 569; and
  - (b) the definition of “*person*” in s 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (**IA**) includes “*a body of persons, corporate or unincorporate*”. Accordingly, a company such as the Plaintiff (which has authored the Drawings) can possess moral rights under s 25(2) CA and may exercise such rights under s 25(4) CA.

37. Mr. Selva has contended, among others as follows:

- (1) the Plaintiff cannot have any moral rights in the Drawings under s 25(2) CA because -
  - (a) the Plaintiff is not the author of the Drawings;
  - (b) moral rights under s 25(2) CA are only conferred on “*purely artistic and/or creative endeavour*”. The Plaintiff has no moral rights under s 25(2) CA in the Drawings which are –
    - (i) prepared in accordance with RER and By-Laws (KL); and
    - (ii) not “*purely artistic and/or creative*”; **and/or**
  - (c) the wording of s 25(2), (5) and (6) CA means that s 25(2) CA only confers moral rights on an author of a work who is a natural person;
- (2) the Defendant had not breached the Plaintiff’s moral rights in the Drawings because the Plaintiff had issued a Letter of Release;
- (3) the Defendant can rely on reg. 24 RER, by-laws 4, 6, 7 and 8 By-Laws (KL) as a defence to the Plaintiff’s claim that the Plaintiff’s moral rights in the Drawings had been infringed; and

(4) the Defendant has relied on the following, among others –

(a) **Syed Ahmad Jamal**;

(b) Professor Khaw Lake Tee’s article, “*The Author’s Moral Rights under the Malaysian Copyright Law*”, [1994] 1 MLJ cxxv;

(c) the majority judgment of the Federal Court in **Kesultanan Pahang v Sathask Realty Sdn Bhd** [1998] 2 CLJ 559; and

(d) the High Court case of **TR Hamzah & Yeang Sdn Bhd v Lazar Sdn Bhd** [1984] 2 CLJ (Rep) 488.

38. Firstly, as explained in the above Part F(3), the Plaintiff was the author of the Drawings because the Plaintiff was the “*artist*” of the Drawings under the definition of “*author*” in s 3(c) CA [not under s 3(g) CA (as submitted by the Plaintiff)].

39. Secondly, I reject the Defendant’s contention that moral rights in s 25(2)(a), (b)(i) and (ii) CA cannot be conferred on the Drawings which are not “*purely artistic and/or creative endeavour*”. This is because the wording of s 25(2) CA does not confine moral rights to a work which is “*purely artistic and/or creative*”.

40. Thirdly, I am not able to find any previous Malaysian case which has decided on the question of whether s 25(2) CA only confers moral rights on

an author of a work who is a natural person. **Syed Ahmad Jamal** is the only Malaysian case which has interpreted s 25(2) CA but that case solely concerns an individual author.

41. I have looked at the copyright legislation and case law of the following countries regarding moral rights:

(1) the Copyright Act of Singapore (Part IX, ss 187-193);

(2) UK's CDPA (Chapter 4, ss 77-89);

(3) the Copyright Act 1968 of Australia [**CA 1968 (Australia)**] (Part IX, ss 189-195AZR);

(4) CA 1994 (NZ) (Part 4, ss 94-110);

(5) the Copyright Act of Canada (RSC, 1985,c. C-42) (s 14); and

(6) the Copyright Act 1957 of India (s 57).

42. My research reveals that s 190 CA 1968 (Australia) has expressly provided that only an individual can have moral rights in a work. I cannot find any case in Singapore, UK, NZ, Canada and India which has decided on the issue of whether a company may be conferred moral rights in a work.

43. I accept Mr. Selva's submission that s 25(2)(a), (b)(i) and (ii) CA only confer moral rights on the author of a work who is a natural person. This decision is based on the following reasons:

- (1) s 25(2), (4), (5) and (6) CA have expressly provided for the scenario when an author of a work has died and the author's personal representative may then act for the author's estate. The express reference to the author's death and the author's personal representative in s 25(2), (4), (5) and (6) CA, evinces Parliament's intention to confine moral rights in s 25(2) CA to an individual author only;
- (2) s 25(2)(b)(ii) CA has expressly provided for "*distortion, mutilation or modification*" of a work which "*might reasonably be regarded as adversely affecting the author's honour*". The word "*honour*" as used in s 25(2)(b)(ii) CA, can only refer to an author who is a natural person (not a company). It is difficult, if not impossible, to envisage a company having "*honour*" in a work within the meaning of s 25(2)(b)(ii) CA; and
- (3) the entire provision of s 25 CA does not refer at all to the winding up or dissolution of a corporate author. Such an omission by the legislature is deliberate so as to confine moral rights in s 25(2) CA to individual authors only.

44. Regarding the application of the definition of "*person*" in s 3 IA, I am of the following view:

- (1) Part I IA (which contains, among others, s 3 IA) applies to CA by virtue of s 2(1)(a) IA (because CA has been enacted after 18.5.1867);
- (2) s 2(3)(b) IA provides that Part 1 IA shall not apply where there is something in the subject or context of the legislation in question which is inconsistent with or repugnant to the application of Part 1 IA; and
- (3) as explained in the above paragraph 43, the wording of s 25(2), (4), (5) and (6) CA shows Parliament's intention to confer moral rights in a work on individual authors only. As such, the application of the wide definition of "*person*" in s 3 IA (to include companies) will be –
  - (a) inconsistent with the subject or context of s 25 CA; **and/or**
  - (b) repugnant to s 25 CA.

In view of the intention of legislature in s 25 CA, by reason of s 2(3)(b) IA, I decline to apply the broad definition of "*person*" [in s 3 IA] to s 25 CA. In the Federal Court case of **Kesultanan Pahang**, the majority judgments of Mohd. Azmi FCJ (at p. 576 and 585-586) and Mohd. Dzaidin FCJ (at p. 616-620) (as he then was), declined to apply the wide definition of "*person*" in the relevant interpretation

legislation (to include companies) to s 6(i)(b) of the Sultanate Lands Enactment 1919 of Pahang.

45. As the Plaintiff cannot have moral rights in the Drawings under s 25(2) CA, the Defendant could not have infringed such rights when the Defendant replaced the Plaintiff's name as M & E Engineer in the Title Block with the Defendant's name.
46. For the sake of completeness, if a party has moral rights in a work under s 25(2)(a), (b)(i) and (ii) CA –
  - (1) a breach of an author's moral rights under s 25(2) CA constitutes a breach of statutory duty under s 25(4) CA (**Breach of Statutory Duty**) for which the author may claim damages – please see **Syed Ahmad Jamal**;
  - (2) there cannot be reliance on the following subsidiary legislation as a defence to a Breach of Statutory Duty –
    - (a) reg. 24 RER -

*“A registered Person shall –*

- (a) *discharge his professional duties with due skill, care, diligence and good faith;*

*(b) at all times hold paramount the safety, health and interest of the public; and*

*(c) take reasonable steps to reduce foreseeable adverse effects of professional engineering services on the environment.”;*  
and

(b) by-laws 4, 6, 7 and 8 By-Laws (KL).

The above subsidiary legislation does not concern moral rights in a work, let alone provide a defence against a suit for a Breach of Statutory Duty;

(3) in respect of the Plaintiff’s Letter of Release –

(a) the contents of the Plaintiff’s Letter of Release did not state that the Plaintiff’s Letter of Release had retrospective effect; and

(b) the Plaintiff’s Letter of Release only allowed the Main Contractor to appoint a 2<sup>nd</sup> Engineer for the Project. The Defendant could not therefore rely on the Plaintiff’s Letter of Release as a defence against any claim based on a Breach of Statutory Duty; and

(4) I am leaving open the question of whether an author’s word, representation or conduct may –

(a) estop the author from enforcing the author's moral rights under s 25(2) CA; or

(b) waive the author's moral rights under s 25(2) CA.

#### H. Whether Defendant had defrauded Plaintiff in respect of Drawings

47. The Plaintiff has contended that the Defendant has committed fraud on the Plaintiff (**Allegation of Fraud**) as follows:

- (1) the Defendant had fraudulently replaced the Plaintiff's name as M & E Engineer in the Title Block with the Defendant's name without the Plaintiff's knowledge and consent (**Defendant's Amendment of Title Block**);
- (2) the Defendant had fraudulently used the Drawings (with the Defendant's name as M & E Engineer in the Title Block) for the Project without the Plaintiff's knowledge and consent;
- (3) the Defendant had fraudulently misrepresented that the Defendant had prepared the Drawings with full knowledge that the Drawings were produced by the Plaintiff; and
- (4) Encik Muhammad, the Defendant's director and mechanical engineer, had been found guilty of a disciplinary offence and had been punished by the DC.

48. As to what amounts to a tort of fraud, I refer to the Federal Court's judgment delivered by Raja Azlan Shah CJ (Malaya) (as His Majesty then was) in **PJTV Denson (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors v Roxy (M) Sdn Bhd** [1980] 2 MLJ 136, at , as follows:

*"Whether fraud exists is a question of fact, to be decided upon the circumstances of each particular case. Decided cases are only illustrative of fraud. Fraud must mean "actual fraud, i.e. dishonesty of some sort" for which the registered proprietor is a party or privy. "Fraud is the same in all courts, but such expressions as 'constructive fraud' are ... inaccurate;" but "'fraud' ... implies a wilful act, on the part of one, whereby another is sought to be deprived, by unjustifiable means, of what he is entitled." (per Romilly M.R. in Green v Nixon (1857) 23 Beav 530 535 53 ER 208). Thus in Waimiha Sawmilling Co Ltd v Waione Timber Co Ltd [1926] AC 101 & 106 it was said that "if the designed object of a transfer be to cheat a man of a known existing right, that is fraudulent..."*

(emphasis added).

49. In **Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd** [2015] 5 AMR 497, at paragraphs 48-53, the Federal Court in a judgment delivered by Richard Malanjum CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) has decided that an allegation of fraud, even if such an allegation concerns "*criminal fraud*", need only be proven on a balance of probabilities and not beyond all reasonable doubt.

As such, the Plaintiff is only required to prove the Allegation of Fraud on a balance of probabilities.

50. Firstly, I am of the view that the Plaintiff cannot rely on the DC's Decision to support the Allegation of Fraud. This is because the DC's Decision merely concerned Encik Muhammad's disciplinary violation regarding the Defendant's failure to obtain the Plaintiff's consent before the Defendant could act as the Project's 2<sup>nd</sup> Engineer. There is nothing in the DC's Decision to support the Allegation of Fraud.

51. I make a finding of fact that the Plaintiff has failed to discharge the legal burden under ss 101(1), (2) and 102 of the Evidence Act 1950 to prove the Allegation of Fraud on a balance of probabilities. This finding is premised on the following evidence and reasons:

(1) as explained in the above Part G, the Plaintiff has no moral rights in the Drawings;

(2) the Main Contractor has copyright in the Drawings [please see the above Part F(4)]. The party who can rightfully complain regarding the Defendant's Amendment of Title Block, is the Main Contractor (not the Plaintiff). In this case, there is no complaint by the Main Contractor concerning –

(a) the Defendant's Amendment of Title Block; and

- (b) the Defendant's subsequent use of the Drawings without any reference to the Plaintiff;
- (3) the Main Contractor knew that the Plaintiff had prepared the Drawings. As such, the Main Contractor could not have been deceived in any manner by the Defendant's Amendment of Title Block; and
- (4) the Main Contractor had replaced the Plaintiff as the Consultant with the Defendant. In this case, the Defendant was only carrying out its duties owed to the Main Contractor regarding the Project. There is therefore no evidence of actual dishonesty (as explained in **PJTV Denson**) on the part of the Defendant in this case.

52. Even if it is assumed that the Defendant had defrauded the Plaintiff regarding the Drawings, I find as a fact that the Plaintiff has failed to discharge the legal onus to prove any loss or damage due to the Defendant's fraud. In this case, the Plaintiff had not adduced any evidence to prove that the Defendant's Amendment of Title Block and the Defendant's subsequent use of the Drawings (without acknowledging that it was the Plaintiff which had produced the Drawings) had caused any loss or damage to the Plaintiff's income, business, goodwill and/or reputation.

## I. Court's decision

53. In summary –

- (1) the Main Contractor (not the Plaintiff) has copyright in the Drawings under s 26(2)(a) CA because the Main Contractor had commissioned the Plaintiff to prepare the Drawings. The contents of the Title Block cannot deny the Main Contractor's copyright in the Drawings;
- (2) s 25(2)(a), (b)(i) and (ii) CA only confer moral rights in a work on its author who is a natural person. Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot have moral rights in the Drawings under s 25(2)(a), (b)(i) and (ii) CA which can be breached by the Defendant; and
- (3) the Plaintiff has failed to discharge the legal burden to prove the Allegation of Fraud on a balance of probabilities.

54. Premised on the above evidence and reasons, this suit is dismissed with costs and an allocatur fee shall be imposed on the sum of costs payable by the Plaintiff to the Defendant.

55. In closing, I must –

- (1) express my gratitude to the Board for instructing Mr. Kok to act as an *amicus curiae* in this case; and

(2) thank all learned counsel in this case, including Mr. Kok, for their able assistance, without which this judgment is not possible.

**WONG KIAN KHEONG**  
Judicial Commissioner  
High Court (Commercial Division)  
Kuala Lumpur

**DATE: 27 APRIL 2017**

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